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Abstract 
Psychological essentialism is a folk theory characterized by the belief that a causal internal 
essence or force gives rise to the common outward behaviors or attributes of a category's 
members. In two studies, we investigated whether 4- to 7-year-old children evidenced essentialist 
reasoning about heart transplants by asking them to predict whether trading hearts with an 
individual would cause them to take on the donor's attributes. Control conditions asked children 
to consider the effects of trading money with an individual. Results indicated that children 
reasoned according to essentialism, predicting more transfer of attributes in the transplant 
condition vs. the non-bodily money control. Children also endorsed essentialist transfer of 
attributes even when they did not believe that a transplant would change the recipient's category 
membership (e.g., endorsing the idea that a recipient of a pig's heart would act pig-like, but 
denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from a 
strong interpretation of the "minimalist" position, an alternative to essentialism.  
 
My Heart Made Me Do It: Children's Essentialist Beliefs About Heart Transplants   
 
The third surgeon fixed the pig's heart firm in the place where his own had been. In the morning he did 
not stay with the others at all, but wherever there was a corner he ran to it, and rooted about in it with his 
nose as pigs do. The others wanted to hold him back by the tail of his coat, but that did no good; he tore 
himself loose, and ran wherever the dirt was thickest. 
("The Three Army Surgeons," The Brothers Grimm) 
  
 
 Psychological essentialism is a folk theory with two primary assumptions. First, certain 
categories are believed to be richly-structured natural kinds whose members share many features, 
including deep and non-obvious ones. Second, the members of such categories are assumed to 
possess an underlying causal essence that is responsible for their shared features (Gelman, 2003; 
Medin & Ortony, 1989). Much work suggests that essentialism is an early-developing bias that 
guides how children construct and think about certain categories. Children often view these 
categories as sharply-bounded, natural, and immutable, as opposed to graded, invented, and fluid 
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(Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). Children are also capable of 
attending to internal and inborn aspects of individuals in determining category membership 
(Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Newman & Keil, 2008; Setoh, Baillargeon, & Gelman, 2013), and 
they often privilege category membership over outward perceptual attributes as the basis on 
which to extend novel properties and make predictions about future behavior (Dewar & Xu, 
2009; Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004; Keil, 1989). These findings are all 
consistent with the idea that children attribute essences to natural kind categories, and expect 
such essences to be causally responsible for the category-typical features that emerge. 
 However, the majority of past studies of essentialism have focused on how children 
expect certain categories to have rich, nonobvious structure and how they use this expectation to 
license inductive inferences, leaving open questions about children's beliefs in the causal scope 
and power of essences. The current study addresses this issue by asking children about the 
consequences of an organ donation. If children believe that essences reside within internal parts, 
and that essences have causal powers, then transferring parts from a donor to a recipient may 
also be believed to cause the recipient to take on some of the donor's characteristics. (This sort of 
prediction is precisely the premise behind the Grimm tale about the pig-like surgeon, quoted at 
the beginning.) The current study focuses on this pattern of essentialist thinking, asking whether 
young children systematically believe that the transfer of an internal bodily element--the heart--
could cause recipients to take on aspects of their donors. 
  Prior research suggests that, for adults, organ transplants are essentialized in this fashion. 
People dislike the idea of receiving transplants from morally objectionable individuals (Hood, 
Gjersoe, Donnelly, Byers, & Itajkura, 2011), a preference that could be attributed to people's 
expectations that such transplants may confer an immoral essence. Even more tellingly, both 
transplant patients and members of the general public often explicitly endorse the possibility of 
taking on attributes of organ donors, including personality traits and preferences (Inspector, 
Kutz, & David, 2004; Sanner, 2001a, 2001b). A recent study elaborated on these findings by 
asking adults, in both the United States and India, directly about causal essentialist beliefs 
regarding heart, blood, and DNA transplants from a wide range of donor types (including 
humans and non-human animals) (Meyer, Leslie, Gelman, & Stilwell, 2013). Consistent with 
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essentialism, people often reported that an organ donation (but not a non-bodily money transfer) 
could confer donors' traits to recipients (both themselves and another individual).  
 The patterns of thinking observed in the above studies are particularly interesting in light 
of the lack of scientific basis or empirical evidence for predicting that an organ donation has the 
power to transfer a donor's attributes. In other words, adults possess a belief that runs counter to 
evidence or teaching. In contrast, many past studies of essentialism tap into intuitions about 
natural kinds that, ultimately, are empirically supported or have some basis in truth; for instance, 
it is consistent with empirical observation that inborn species membership typically remains 
constant despite outward changes, and is often a reliable basis for drawing inductive inferences. 
In contrast, there is no scientific evidence to support essentialist intuitions in the context of an 
organ transplant. The fact that adults nevertheless often endorse the causal powers of a 
transplanted essence speaks to the strength of an essentialist bias. 
 The current studies turn the focus to children's beliefs, asking whether children, too, show 
evidence of such an empirically unsupported essentialist bias regarding the causal powers of an 
internal bodily part. Specifically, we asked whether young children believe that getting a heart 
transplant could cause properties to be transferred from the donor to themselves. The heart was 
selected for study because it is a plausible locus of an individual's essence (as it is bodily, 
inherent, and internal), because it is familiar to children, and because prior research examining 
adults' transplant beliefs included the heart (e.g., Meyer et al., 2013). There is also preliminary 
evidence that children ascribe causal properties to the heart. By early elementary school age, 
children report that trading hearts with someone has the power to cause the recipient to take on 
the donor's traits of kindness (and meanness), as well as emotions including happiness, sadness, 
and love (Johnson, 1990; Winer, Cottrell, & Bica, 2009). Though results from these studies 
appear consistent with essentialism, they are limited in that they are focused exclusively on traits 
and features that are metaphorically or culturally associated with the heart--emotions and 
kindness (along with other non-emotional attributes and psychological processes unique to the 
individual, such as specific knowledge and identity). Children may have thus been responding 
based on their belief that hearts function to determine certain specific emotions and feelings, 
rather than believing more broadly that essences determine individuals’ behaviors and trait-like 
features. Furthermore, prior studies were not designed to test children's essentialist intuitions, but 
rather compared children's beliefs about the causal powers of the heart to predictions regarding a 
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brain transplant.  
 The current studies directly tested children’s essentialist beliefs regarding a wider range 
of human and non-human animal trait-like attributes, asking children whether their personality or 
behavior would change to be more like that of the donor after a transplant. Posing the scenario as 
a transplant/donation to the children themselves--rather than an unknown or fictional individual--
was designed to maximally appeal to children's intuitive folk beliefs regarding essences, and to 
make the scenario simple to understand. For the human trials, we asked not only about the traits 
of kindness and meanness, which are traditionally associated with the heart, but also about the 
extent to which a heart transplant would confer the donor's intelligence on the recipient. This 
served as an especially stringent test of essentialism, as it is highly unlikely that children have 
ever been exposed to idioms or cultural messages implying that the heart is responsible for this 
attribute. For the non-human trials, we presented scenarios involving donations from a pig and a 
monkey, in order to test children's intuitions regarding the causal powers of transplants from 
different species. We also selected these traits and non-human animals because they were 
investigated in a similar context in adult work (Meyer et al., 2013) and are familiar even to 
young children (Heyman & Gelman, 1999, 2000). Finally, we also included children younger 
than those in prior studies concerning transplants; previous studies of essentialism in children 
have suggested that it is present in the preschool years (e.g., Gelman, 2003), yet previous 
investigations of children’s beliefs about transplants have focused only on children of elementary 
school age or older. 
 Our studies also included a control condition that described trading either money (Studies 
1 and 2) or a collar (Study 2) in order to allow for comparisons between beliefs about the causal 
powers of an internal, biological element--the heart--and an external, non-biological possession. 
If children reported more transfer of traits in the heart vs. the money/collar trade, this would 
provide evidence in favor of essentialism, as it would suggest that the causal force was construed 
as being internal and bodily. If this pattern were to be obtained, it would also rule out the 
possibility that children's predictions of trait transfer after a heart transplant were due to (1) a 
simple positive response bias or task demands or (2) a broader style of magical thinking related 
to generalized contagion effects (the idea that direct or indirect physical contact can transmit 
aspects of an individual; Johnson & Jacobs, 2001; Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994). Either of these 
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alternative interpretations would result in children reporting that both heart and money/collar 
exchanges result equally in transfer of attributes.  
 In addition to examining children's beliefs about the causal powers of a transplant, a 
second focus of our study was to address a theoretical criticism of essentialism known as 
"minimalism" (Strevens, 2000). On its strongest reading (see Meyer et al., 2013, for discussion 
of other readings), the minimalist approach holds that when people seek to explain outward 
category-typical features, they appeal directly to category membership as the basis for their 
explanations, rather than representing essences as intervening causal forces. More specifically, 
the minimalist position describes both children and adults as expecting the operation of a "K-
law" (K standing for "kind"), according to which they believe there is something about being a 
member of a kind that leads to the possession of a category-typical feature. Importantly, that 
"something" need not be an essence (i.e., a category-specific, internal, innate causal force), but 
rather may be left wholly unspecified; it is just a “brute fact” (Strevens, 2000, p. 154) that a 
category and a feature are linked. For instance, rather than attributing a pig's properties to the 
presence of a pig’s essence, minimalism claims that people instead need only appeal to the pig's 
category membership; so long as an individual is a pig, then that individual will display pig-like 
behavior, and no causal intervening essence is considered at all.  
 The minimalist position reinterprets data traditionally used to support psychological 
essentialism, arguing that children's and adults' well-documented tendency to assume the 
existence of richly structured natural kinds, and to infer properties on the basis of category 
membership, can be explained more parsimoniously through K-laws (Strevens, 2000, 2001). 
Although minimalism was proposed as a challenge to essentialism over fifteen years ago, it 
continues to be debated (e.g., Houkes & Vermaas, 2013; Leslie, 2013; Sloman & Malt, 2003; 
Smith, 2014; Weisberg, 2007), and only one empirical study has been designed to directly pit its 
predictions against those from psychological essentialism. Meyer et al. (2013) did this in their 
study of adults' essentialist intuitions regarding transplants. As described above, that set of 
studies asked adult subjects to report on the likelihood that traits would transfer to an individual 
who received an organ from one of a variety of donors. Some of these donors belonged to a 
different species, namely a pig and a chimpanzee. For these non-human donors, an additional 
question was included that asked subjects to report whether recipients' category membership 
would change after receiving a donation from these animals. If adults appealed simply to 
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category membership as the license to form predictions about attributes (the reasoning process 
proposed by minimalism), one would then predict that attribute change (e.g., acting more pig-
like) would only be predicted in cases when the respondent also endorsed some degree of 
category change. Yet results indicated that adults readily provided predictions of trait transfer, 
while simultaneously denying that recipients' category membership would change (e.g., they 
often reported that the recipient of a pig's heart might act more pig-like, but uniformly denied 
that the recipient would become a pig). This pattern of responding provided clear support in an 
adult sample against the predictions of minimalism, and instead supported the predictions of 
essentialism (also see Ahn et al., 2001; Strevens, 2001).  
 Questions remain, however, regarding whether children also appeal to essences. Because 
psychological essentialism is claimed to be an early-developing bias, it is important to again test 
minimalist predictions, this time in a developmental sample. The current studies accomplish this, 
asking whether young children believe that the transfer of an internal biological part is capable of 
exerting effects independent of the recipient's category membership. Specifically, for the two 
non-human donors in our transplant scenarios (the pig and the monkey), we asked children not 
just whether getting a heart from these animals would result in a transfer of pig or monkey 
attributes, but also whether the child would become a pig or a monkey (i.e., change category 
membership). If children engage in essentialist reasoning, we would expect them to report that 
the transfer of a heart can have causal effects even if category membership of the recipient does 
not change. This would imply that children were not simply basing their predictions of category-
typical behavior on an individual's category membership, but rather on a belief in the causal 
powers of a transferred essence.  
 To summarize, our studies were designed to address several unresolved issues regarding 
children's essentialist intuitions by (1) asking children to consider how heart transplants might 
affect a range of attributes, including ones not traditionally associated with the heart, including 
those associated with different non-human kinds, and (2) providing a test of strongly minimalist 
accounts by focusing on the potential causal power of an essence independent of category 
membership. Study 1 explored children's beliefs about transplants in a between-subjects design, 
in which children reported their predictions of change after either a heart transplant, or the 
exchange of a quarter. Study 2 extended findings from Study 1, in a within-subjects design in 
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which children provided predictions of change after either a heart transplant or an exchange of 
money (this time a dollar).  
 
Method 
 
  The final sample included 72 children in two age groups (4- and 5-year-olds: n=36, 
referred to as "younger children"; 6- and 7-year-olds: n=36, referred to as "older children"). An 
equal number of children in each age group (n=18) participated in the heart transplant and the 
non-bodily money control conditions (Heart: younger children Mage=5.00 yrs., SD=0.64; older 
children Mage=6.77 yrs., SD=0.69; Money: younger children, Mage=5.50 yrs., SD=0.56; older 
children, Mage
 
=6.75 yrs., SD=0.55). Data from two additional children were excluded due to 
experimenter error.  
 Heart transplant vignettes described trading hearts with one of six donors (nice child, 
mean child, smart child, not-smart child, pig, and monkey) (Appendix). Each human donor 
vignette had a male and female version, matched to the participant’s sex. Pictures accompanied 
each vignette depicting the donor engaging in behaviors characteristic of the relevant trait (for 
human donors) or category (for animal donors) (Table 1). Money Control vignettes described 
trading a quarter with each character and included only the four human donors, as animals do not 
possess money. Picture content and vignette text were otherwise identical to heart transplant 
vignettes. 
 For both the Heart and Money conditions, donors were grouped into pairs (for Heart, 
pairs were smart + not-smart, nice + mean, pig + monkey; for Money, pairs were smart + not-
smart and nice + mean). We ordered pairs in all possible combinations, creating six orders for the 
Heart condition and two orders for the Money condition. The number of orders for each 
condition was then doubled by reversing the order of the members within pairs. Heart vs. money 
was a between-subjects factor. An equal number of children within each condition participated in 
the twelve heart transplant orders or the four money control orders.  
    
 Vignettes were read aloud with accompanying pictures. For each character, three sample 
behaviors were provided that supported the character's trait or species identity. Children then 
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heard a brief description of either the heart or money exchange and were asked an initial forced-
choice test question assessing predictions of attribute change: "If you got [Donor's] heart/quarter, 
would you end up [acquiring Donor’s attribute], or would you stay the same?" (e.g., for the male 
"smart" heart donor named Sam, the test question was, "If you got Sam's heart, would you end 
up being smarter, like Sam, or would you stay the same?") If children responded with "stay the 
same," the trial ended. If children responded with endorsement of change, five circles of 
increasing size were shown, and the experimenter asked the child to point to the circle 
representing the amount of change the child predicted, ranging from "just a little bit" (smallest 
circle) to "a whole lot" (largest circle). For the animal donors, the attribute change question was 
phrased similarly to the attribute question for human donors: "If you got the pig's/monkey's 
heart, would you end up acting and feeling more like a pig/monkey, or would you stay the 
same?" An additional question assessing category change was then asked: "If you got the 
pig's/monkey's heart, would you end up being a pig/monkey, or would you still be a person?"  If 
a child answered "still be a person," the trial ended. If a child endorsed category change, he/she 
was asked, "How much would you be a pig/monkey?" with the same pictorial Likert scale as 
before. We used the same scale for the category membership question as for the property 
inference question, in order to be able to compare responses across the two measures.   
--------------------------------------Table 1 appears about here ----------------------- 
 
  
Scores for predicted attribute change could range from 0 ("stay the same") to 5 
(indicating the greatest degree of change). A summary score was calculated for attribute change 
by averaging across human donors (excluding animal donors, as they were not featured in the 
money condition, and were designed to test the predictions of minimalism). A 2 (age group: 
younger vs. older) x 2 (condition: heart vs. money) x2 (valence: positive [smart, nice] vs. 
negative [not-smart, mean]) mixed between-within ANOVA for attribute change revealed a main 
effect for condition, F(1,68) = 12.86, p < .01, ηp2  = .16, with scores higher for heart transplants 
(M = 2.26, SD = 1.84) than money transfers (M = 0.93, SD = 1.37). There was also an age group 
x condition interaction, F(1,68) = 6.17, p = .02, ηp2  = .08. To explore this interaction, we again 
examined condition-based differences within each age group. The condition effect was 
significant in older children, t(34) = 4.73, p < .001, but not in younger children, t(34) = 0.72, p = 
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.48 (Figure 1). (The pairwise comparisons in this follow-up, and all subsequent ones, were 
uncorrected.) Comparison of heart and money scores between age groups indicated it was 
specifically younger children's money scores (M = 1.38, SD = 1.63) that were significantly 
higher than older children's (M = 0.47, SD = 0.86), t(34) = 2.09, p = .04; in contrast, scores for 
heart were not different between younger and older children (p = .13). Individual response 
patterns were consistent with the mean comparisons indicating that older, but not younger, 
children differentiated between heart and money; whereas 14/18 older children in the heart 
condition endorsed attribute change at least once for human donors, only 5/18 older children in 
the money condition did the same; this difference was significant (Fisher’s exact test, p < .01). In 
contrast, approximately equal numbers of younger children in the heart and money conditions 
endorsed change (11 in heart, and 10 in money); this was non-significant, p >.10. Thus, there 
was clear evidence that older children endorsed the transfer of traits via heart transplants, though 
younger children did not differentiate between the heart and money conditions.  
There was additionally a main effect of valence, F(1,68) = 14.03, p < .001, ηp2  =  .17, 
with positive traits (M = 1.97, SD = 2.04) receiving higher endorsements of change than negative 
traits (M = 1.22, SD = 1.80). This effect was qualified by a valence x age group interaction, 
F(1,68) = 9.34, ηp2
Finally, to test whether effects for older children were solely driven by endorsement of 
attribute change for aspects traditionally associated with the heart (meanness and niceness), we 
examined scores for the heart and money conditions for the smart/not-smart trials alone. Here 
again, consistent with analyses of the summary score, children were significantly more likely to 
endorse change in the heart condition (M = 2.39, SD =  2.13) than the money condition (M = 
0.42, SD = 0.85), t(34) = 3.67, p < .01. Individual response patterns were consistent with this 
analysis; 12/18 children gave at least one prediction of attribute change in the smart/not-smart 
 = .12; whereas younger children showed a pronounced preference for 
endorsing transfer of positive traits (M = 2.27, SD = 2.16) over negative traits (M = 1.67, SD = 
1.89), t(35) = 4.71, p < .001, this difference was not significant in older children (positive M = 
1.67, SD = 1.90; negative M = 1.53, SD = 2.08; t(35) = 0.51, p = .62). No other main effects or 
interactions were observed, all ps > .44. The valence effect in younger children suggests that, 
regardless of condition, they may have been reluctant to endorse negative attributes in 
themselves.  
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trials for the heart condition, whereas only 4/18 did so in the money condition, p = .02 by 
Fisher’s exact test.  
----------------------------------------Figure 1 appears about here--------------------------------- 
 
 Summary change scores were calculated by averaging across the animal donors (featured 
only in the Heart condition) for the attribute change and category change questions separately; as 
before, scores for attribute change could range from 0 (no change) to 5 ("a whole lot" of change), 
and scores for category change could range from 0 (corresponding to no category change, or 
"stay a person") to 5 (corresponding to "a whole lot" of being a non-human animal). A 2 (age 
group: younger vs. older) x 2 (question: attribute vs. category) ANOVA was conducted, with 
question as a within-subjects variable. Supporting our prediction that endorsement of attribute 
change would be higher than endorsement of category change, there was a main effect for 
question, F(1,34) = 31.75, p < .001, ηp2  = .48, with significantly higher scores on the attribute 
change questions (M = 2.52, SD = 1.82) than the category change questions (M = 0.69, SD = 
1.60). There was also a main effect for age group, F(1,34) = 7.72, p < .01, ηp2 
-----------------------------------------Table 2 appears about here.------------------------------------- 
 = .19, whereby 
older children were overall more likely to endorse change of any type (M = 2.21, SD = 1.45) than 
younger children (M = 1.01, SD = 1.13). Finally, there was no age group x question interaction. 
Although the interaction was not significant, we nevertheless examined the effect of question 
within each age group to determine whether this effect held for both older and younger children; 
differences were indeed significant for both age groups according to t–tests, ps < .01 (older 
children's attribute change M = 3.25, SD = 1.59, category change M = 1.17, SD = 1.98; younger 
children's attribute change M = 1.79, SD = 1.78, category change M = 0.22, SD = 0.94). 
Individual response patterns were consistent with the main effect observed for question (see 
Table 2); whereas 27/36 children endorsed attribute change at least once on the pig or monkey 
trials, only 6/36 children endorsed category change on these same trials at least once, Fisher's 
exact p < .001. Moreover, of the 30 children who uniformly denied category change, 21 (70%) 
endorsed attribute change at least once. Thus, children often endorsed attribute change as 
resulting from a heart exchange, while simultaneously denying that the recipient's category 
membership would change.  
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 In summary, six- and seven-year-old children showed clear evidence for essentialism, 
predicting that heart transplants would transfer donors' attributes. They were also significantly 
more likely to make such causal predictions for this scenario than for a non-bodily money 
transfer, indicating that they were representing essences as bodily and internal, and ensuring that 
effects were not simply due to a positive response bias, or to a broader belief in magical 
contagion. Furthermore, they predicted attribute transfer even for traits not traditionally 
associated with the heart (smart and not-smart), suggesting they were not simply basing their 
responses off of a common cultural metaphor.  
 As well, when transplants were described as coming from non-human animals, children 
of both age groups more often endorsed that they would feel or act like the animal than that they 
would become a member of that animal category. Moreover, a majority of children who denied 
that they would change categories still endorsed some degree of attribute transfer. These patterns 
are inconsistent with a strongly minimalist account, which claims that people appeal to category 
membership as the basis for predicting outward features. Instead, the findings support 
essentialism; children expect transfer of an internal, bodily essence to cause the emergence of 
features, independent of category change. These results are consistent with past research 
indicating that children expect internal features to determine category-typical attributes (Gelman 
& Wellman, 1991; Newman, Herrmann, Wynn, & Keil, 2008; Newman & Keil, 2008), but go 
beyond past studies by finding that these internal elements can be represented as a transferrable 
and causal source of attributes.  
 Younger children (4- and 5-year-olds) did not distinguish between heart and money 
transfers, instead predicting that both exchanges would cause themselves to become more like 
their donors. One possible explanation for this finding is that younger children were reluctant to 
attribute negative properties (mean, not-smart) to themselves. Another (non-competing) 
possibility is suggested by the spontaneous comments from a couple of the younger participants, 
who remarked that they did not know what a quarter was (the specific amount of money 
described in the money exchange scenario). Thus, some children, particularly ones in the 
younger group who have less direct contact with money, may have been uncertain about what a 
quarter was, leading to confusion about the task. This is especially likely given that children 
were never shown pictures of either hearts or quarters, and thus if they did not know what a 
quarter was, they would have had no basis for making an informed decision. 
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Children's essentialist beliefs                13 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
 Study 2 was developed to address this possibility. As in Study 1, we asked children to 
make predictions about attribute change after either receiving hearts or money from a series of 
people and animals. However, for the money exchange scenarios, we used a dollar rather than a 
quarter, as we expected that children of all ages would be more familiar with this unit of money.1
 
 
We also added a non-bodily transfer control scenario for the two animals to parallel the money 
control trials for the human characters and to include trials that were not as clearly valenced as 
the original human donor trials. In Study 1, recall that we simply omitted the money control 
items for the animals due to animals not possessing money, but in Study 2 we provided questions 
about transfer of a collar. We selected a collar as the animal "control" condition because we 
wanted an object that an animal had with it for an extended period of time (like money). Finally, 
in order for each participant to serve as their own control, Study 2 included heart vs. dollar/collar 
transfer as a within-subjects factor.  
Method 
 
 The sample (n = 50) included two age groups: 4- and 5-year-olds (n = 24, Mage = 5.05 
years, SD = 0.62, again referred to as “younger children”) and 6- to 7-year-olds, (n = 26, Mage
 
 = 
6.99 years, SD = 0.56, again referred to as “older children”). Children were recruited in the 
Midwest at a university-affiliated children's museum study site.  
 As in Study 1, heart transplant vignettes described trading hearts with a total of six 
donors (nice child, mean child, smart child, not-smart child, pig, and monkey), and each human 
donor vignette had a male and female version, matched to the participant’s sex. Behaviors 
provided as evidence of the character's trait or identity were identical to those used in Study 1, as 
were the pictures depicting the characters (except that animal donors were depicted as wearing 
collars around their necks). Control questions described trading a dollar with each of the four 
human characters, or receiving and wearing the collar of each of the two animal characters. For 
                                                            
1
 Prior research in which children were asked to provide monetary values for items indicated that 
children 4-5 years of age nearly always reported amounts in whole dollars, even for low-value 
items, such as a single crayon, or a cookie with a bite taken out of it (Gelman, Frazier, Noles, 
Manczak, & Stilwell, 2015). 
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both human and animal trials, picture content and vignette text for the control trials were 
otherwise identical to heart transplant vignettes. 
 Donors were grouped into pairs (not smart + smart, nice + mean, pig + monkey). The 
order of the pairs was counterbalanced across participants, as was the order of the donors within 
each pair. Each participant responded to questions about both heart and dollar/collar transfers. 
The order of the test questions was counterbalanced across participants, such that within each 
age group, half of the children were first asked the dollar/collar control questions, and the other 
half were first asked the heart questions. For animal donors only, a third question asked about 
category change (identical to those used in Study 1). 
 
 The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1, except that each item had both 
a heart question and a control (money/collar) question, and condition was a within-subject factor, 
such that each child responded to questions about both heart and money/collar transfers. 
 
  
Scores for predicted attribute change could again range from 0 ("stay the same") to 5 ("a 
whole lot" of change). A summary score was calculated for attribute change by averaging across 
all donors (humans and animals, because unlike Study 1, the animals were included in both 
conditions). A 2 (age group: younger vs. older) x 2 (condition: heart vs. money) x 2 (order: heart 
question first vs. dollar/collar question first) mixed between-within ANOVA indicated the 
predicted main effect for condition, F(1,46) = 33.23, p < .001, ηp2  = .42, with scores higher for 
heart transplants (M = 1.59, SD = 1.70) than money/collar transfers (M = 0.30, SD = 0.69). There 
was also an age group x condition interaction, F(1,46) = 6.06, p = .02, ηp2  = .12, indicating a 
larger effect among older than younger children (Figure 2). Importantly, however, the condition 
effect was significant in both age groups: older children, t(25) = 5.73, p < .001; younger children, 
t(23) = 2.09, p = .048. Individual response patterns indicate that for both age groups, the most 
common response pattern was to have heart scores higher than money scores, consistent with 
essentialism. However, when comparing the number of children whose heart scores were greater 
than their money scores (vs. the opposite pattern, money greater than heart), this was not 
significant for younger children according to a binomial test (p = .30), whereas it was significant 
for older children (p < .01). 
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There was additionally a condition x order interaction, F(1,46) = 8.13, p = .01, ηp2 
 We additionally conducted a targeted 2 (age group: younger vs. older) x 2 (condition: 
heart vs. money) x 2 (order: heart question first vs. dollar/collar question first) mixed between-
within ANOVA, this time examining scores only on trials that did not ask about niceness or 
meanness (i.e., the smart/not-smart and pig/monkey trials), to determine whether children 
expected traits to transfer even when they were not metaphorically or idiomatically associated 
with the heart. The same main effects and interactions from the analysis of all trials reported 
above were obtained. Scores were higher in the heart condition (M = 1.57, SD = 1.75) vs. the 
money condition (M = 0.27, SD = 0.70), F(1,46) = 35.19, η
= .15. 
This interaction appeared to be due to heart scores being attenuated in instances when the 
dollar/collar question was asked first. To test whether condition differences remained significant 
despite this attenuation, we examined condition-based differences within condition order. The 
condition effect was significant both when children received a heart question prior to a 
dollar/collar question (Heart M = 2.11, SD = 1.83; Dollar/Collar M = 0.19, SD = 0.39), t(24) = 
4.96, p < .001, and when they received a dollar/collar question prior to a heart question (Heart M 
= 1.08, SD = 1.43; Dollar/Collar M = 0.42,  SD = 0.89), t(24) = 2.68, p = .01. No other main 
effects or interactions were significant. 
p
2
 = .43. There was also a significant 
condition x age interaction, F(1,46) = 4.98, ηp2 = .10, indicating that effects were larger among 
older than younger children. Nonetheless, condition differences were significant both in age 
groups: younger children (Heart M = 1.04, SD = 1.59; Money/Collar M = 0.24, SD = 0.26), t(23) 
= 2.33, p = .03, and older children (Heart M = 1.42, SD = 1.83; Money/Collar M = 0.29, SD = 
0.81), t(25) = 5.71, p < .001. Finally, there was also a significant condition x order interaction, 
F(1,46) = 8.42, ηp2 = .15. Again, condition differences were attenuated when the dollar/collar 
question was presented first, but condition effects were still significant both when children 
received a heart question prior to a money/collar question (Heart M = 2.13, SD = 1.83; 
Money/Collar M = 0.20, SD = 0.46), t(24) = 5.11, p < .001, and when they received a 
money/collar question prior to a heart question (Heart M = 1.01, SD = 1.50; Money/Collar M = 
0.33,  SD = 0.88), t(24) = 2.84, p < .01. Individual response patterns were consistent with the 
overall condition effect of interest, indicating that children were more likely to endorse attribute 
change in the heart vs. money/collar condition; 30/50 children gave at least one prediction of 
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attribute change in the smart/not-smart/pig/monkey trials for the heart condition, whereas only 
10/50 did so in the money/collar condition, p < .001 by Fisher’s exact test. 
 Lastly, we conducted a second more targeted ANOVA to assess valence effects. Recall 
that results from Study 1 suggested that younger children, but not older children, were more 
likely to endorse the transfer of positive vs. negative traits. To assess this possibility in the 
current analysis, we additionally included condition (heart vs. money) to assess if valence effects 
varied not just according to age (as in Study 1), but also interacted with condition. For this 
analysis, we focused only on the human traits that were clearly valenced (smart and not smart, 
nice and mean), consistent with analyses from Study 1, and we report only effects including 
valence, the factor of interest. The 2 (age group: younger vs. older) x 2 (condition: heart vs. 
money) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of valence, F 
(1, 48) = 5.29, p = .03, ηp2 
----------------------------------------Figure 2 appears about here---------------------------------- 
= .10, with transfer of positive traits more likely to be endorsed (M  = 
1.13, SD = 1.14) than negative traits (M = .85, SD = 1.10). However, valence did not participate 
in any significant two- or three-way interactions (all ps ≥ .30). Thus, unlike in Study 1, the 
valence effect was observed in both younger and older children. 
 
 Summary change scores were again calculated by averaging across the animal donors for 
the attribute change and category change questions separately. As before, scores could range 
from 0-5 for both traits and category change. A 2 (age group: younger vs. older) x 2 (question: 
attribute vs. category) ANOVA was conducted, with question as a within-subjects variable. 
There was a main effect for question, F(1,48) = 25.09, p < .001, ηp2  = .34, with significantly 
higher scores on the personality/behavior change questions (M = 1.50, SD = 1.81) than the 
category change questions (M = 0.29, SD = 1.07). There was also a main effect for age group, 
F(1,48) = 4.12, p < .05, ηp2  = .08, whereby older children were overall more likely to endorse 
change in general (M = 1.22, SD = 1.40) than younger children (M = 0.54, SD = .63). Finally, 
there was no significant age group x question interaction, p = .18. Nevertheless, we examined the 
effect of question within each age group to determine if this effect held for both older and 
younger children. Differences were indeed significant for both age groups according to t–tests, 
ps ≤ .01 (older children's attribute change M = 1.98, SD = 1.73, category change M = 0.46, SD = 
1.39; younger children's attribute change M = 0.98, SD = 1.78, category change M = 0.10, SD = 
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0.51). Individual response patterns (see Table 2) were consistent with the main effect observed 
for question; whereas 25/50 children endorsed personality/behavior change at least once on the 
pig/monkey heart transplant trials, only 4/50 children endorsed category change at least once, 
Fisher's exact p < .001. Furthermore, of the 46 children who denied category change, 21 (or 
46%) endorsed attribute change at least once. Thus, replicating results from Study 1, children 
were often willing to endorse personality/behavior change as resulting from a heart exchange 
while simultaneously denying that the recipient's category membership would change. 
 
 Psychological essentialism can be thought of as consisting of two major beliefs: first, 
certain categories are construed as richly-structured natural kinds, and second, these categories 
are assumed to have an underlying causal essence responsible for category-typical outward 
features (Gelman, 2003). The current studies examined this second assumption, asking whether 
children 4 through 7 years of age expect the transfer of an internal bodily element (the heart) to 
result in the transfer of a donor's attributes. Children frequently predicted that receiving a heart 
from another individual would transfer the personality, feelings, or behaviors of the donor, 
including characteristics that are not traditionally associated with the heart (e.g., intelligence 
[from a smart person's heart]; acting like a pig [from a pig's heart]). Importantly, children's 
expectations of change were higher when considering a heart transplant than when considering 
the transfer of money. This condition difference indicates that the effects were not simply due to 
a response bias to report that change took place, nor did they reflect belief in magical contagion, 
such that mere association with an individual can pass along that individual's qualities (e.g., 
Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994).   
 These findings interacted with age. Whereas the older children (6- to 7-year-olds) 
differentiated between a heart transplant and money transfer in both studies, the younger children 
(4- to 5-year-olds) did so only in Study 2.  However, the younger children's difficulty in Study 1 
appeared to reflect both a reluctance to attribute negative properties to themselves and 
uncertainty about what a quarter is. In Study 2, when a familiar unit of currency was used (dollar 
instead of quarter), the younger children also indicated that a heart transplant would yield 
attribute changes that money transfer would not (i.e., the younger children showed the same 
patterns of results as the older children). Overall, the findings thus indicate that by preschool age, 
children treat an internal bodily part as having causal consequences. This finding is in keeping 
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with past studies that point to children's focus on internal aspects in forming category judgments 
and drawing inductive inferences (e.g., Graham et al., 2004; Newman et al., 2008; Newman & 
Keil, 2008; Setoh et al., 2013), but goes beyond them to demonstrate the causal aspect of 
essentialist beliefs--the idea that something inside gives rise to outward features. This finding is 
also particularly striking because children appear to believe in a causal essence that exists in a 
body part that scientists would argue is not, in fact, causally involved in outward traits, abilities, 
or personalities. The presence of these essentialist beliefs, then, exist despite a lack of empirical 
support, and suggests that essentialism operates as a powerful bias relatively early in 
development.  
  Our findings also speak to an unresolved theoretical debate regarding children's 
representation of essences. In particular, the strongest minimalist alternative to essentialism 
claims that children, when explaining category-typical outward features, appeal only to category 
membership and K-laws (natural laws linking categories to features). Minimalism denies that 
children systematically represent causal essences as an intervening force (Strevens, 2000, 2001). 
Children in our studies, however, frequently endorsed the possibility of their characteristics 
changing upon receiving a pig or a monkey heart, while simultaneously denying that they would 
become a pig or a monkey. This result held equally for younger and older children in both 
studies. Thus, by 4-5 years of age, children appeared not to rely on category membership and K-
laws as a basis for predicting outward features; instead, they expected causal effects even if they 
(the recipient) stayed a member of a contrasting category (namely, human). These findings are 
inconsistent with strong minimalism and are instead in keeping with predictions of essentialism; 
children appeal to an internal causal essence when making predictions about outward features. 
(See Meyer et al. (2013) for discussion of weaker interpretations of minimalism; briefly, the 
authors argue that weaker interpretations of the minimalist thesis do not constitute substantive 
empirical alternatives to essentialism.) 
 The present investigation still leaves several issues unaddressed. In particular, it will be 
important in the future to present additional transfer scenarios beyond those used in the current 
study, in order to refine our understanding of exactly what sorts of donations are essentialized by 
children. For instance, in our study, we did not control (across the heart vs. money/collar 
conditions) approximate value or duration of possession (hearts are arguably more valuable and 
owned for a longer period of time than quarters, dollars, or collars). Essentialism predicts that 
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these dimensions would not matter, and that it is a donation's status as innate, biological, and 
internal that would drive expectations of trait transfer. However, this is an empirical question yet 
to be resolved. Moreover, it will be useful to examine children's essentialist intuitions regarding 
donations that meet only one, two, or all of the criteria claimed to be important for construing 
something as a vehicle for essence; for instance, would children expect skin or hair (innate, 
biological, but non-internal) to transfer attributes? What of a pacemaker (non-innate, non-
biological, but internal)? Varying these dimensions in future investigations will allow us to better 
understand what exactly is interpreted as containing essences. 
   Another unresolved issue is how precisely essentialism changes across development. 
The current data clearly indicate that young children demonstrate causal essentialist expectations 
in the context of reasoning about heart transplants. However, results are not definitive regarding 
change across development within the age groups under investigation (four- to seven-year-olds), 
in light of the complicating valence effects observed in younger children in both studies. And 
similar work in adults (Meyer et al., 2013) used non-parallel measures of essentialist predictions, 
disallowing direct comparison of children's and adults' essentialism. Future work can expand the 
age ranges that are examined, and also examine how cultural upbringing interacts with the trait 
under investigation (e.g., see Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Diesendruck, 2013). Relatedly, work can 
directly target how children and adults integrate acquired scientific knowledge with their 
essentialist expectations. Psychological essentialism is often described as involving a placeholder 
notion of essence; one need not know the precise nature or structure of an essence in order to 
believe that it exists (Medin & Ortony, 1989). Instead, essentialism can be reflected by the belief 
that something internal, innate, and bodily is responsible for the emergence of a category's 
features. However, adults--at least adults in many cultures with formal education--often seem to 
attribute essence-like powers to genes; that is, they appear to fill in an essence placeholder with 
their understanding of how genes function to determine species identity, physical make-up, and 
category-typical behaviors.  
 The tendency to combine essentialist expectations with predictions drawn from biological 
knowledge has consequences for how people attribute and explain the behaviors of others. For 
instance, assuming that genes have essence-like powers often results in over-attributing many 
behaviors and characteristics to innate, stable, and internal elements of people. These patterns of 
thinking are particularly interesting in the social realm, where genetic essentialism is often 
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associated with stereotyping, prejudice, and the exaggeration of inter-group differences (Dar-
Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Keller, 2005; Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013). It will be important 
in future work to establish the precise developmental pathway by which people come to fill in 
their placeholder notion of essence with their understanding of genes. Moreover, it will be useful 
to examine the factors that contribute to such beliefs (e.g., educational experience, family beliefs, 
cultural background), as there are substantial individual differences in the extent to which adults 
form genetic essentialist predictions, and the types of categories to which they apply these 
explanations (e.g., non-human animal vs. social groups).  
 In sum, the current studies are the first to provide direct evidence that children attribute 
causal powers to an inherent, internal force: children expect the transfer of such a force, via a 
heart transplant, to confer a donor's attributes on the recipient. Our findings thus provide support 
for the idea that children are psychological essentialists, and suggest that such a bias is both 
early-developing and strong, existing independent of empirical support for its predictions.  
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Appendix: Story text from the Heart and Money Conditions in Studies 1 and 2. Text in brackets 
varied according to the character described (see Table 1); provided sample text is for the "mean" 
female character.  
 
Heart Story Text: This is [Mia], and [Mia] is really [mean]. Look, when [Mia] is [drawing 
pictures, she never shares crayons with the other kids. When someone in her class dropped a toy 
and it broke, Mia just laughed. And yesterday, Mia pushed someone when everyone else was 
playing tag.] So [Mia] is really [mean]. Now imagine that you and [Mia] traded hearts, so you 
ended up with [Mia's] heart inside your body. It doesn't hurt; you just end up with [Mia's] heart 
inside you. If you got [Mia's] heart, would you end up being [meaner], like [Mia], or would you 
stay the same? 
A "stay same" response ended the trial. A response of attribute change was followed by: 
How much [meaner]? Just a little bit like this (point to small circle), a whole lot like this (point 
to largest circle), or somewhere in between (sweeping point to middle three circles)? 
Money Story Text: This is [Mia], and [Mia] is really [mean]. Look, when [Mia] is [drawing 
pictures, she never shares crayons with the other kids. When someone in her class dropped a toy 
and it broke, Mia just laughed. And yesterday, Mia pushed someone when everyone else was 
playing tag.] So [Mia] is really [mean]. Now imagine that you and [Mia] both have 
quarters/dollars*, and you and [Mia] traded quarters/dollars, so you ended up with [Mia's] 
quarter/dollar. If you got [Mia's] quarter/dollar, would you end up being [meaner], like [Mia], or 
would you stay the same? 
A "stay same" response ended the trial. A response of attribute change was followed by: 
How much [meaner]? Just a little bit like this (point to small circle), a whole lot like this (point 
to largest circle), or somewhere in between (sweeping point to middle three circles)? 
 
* Quarter was used in Study 1, and Dollar was used in Study 2.  
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Table 1 
 
Characters and Behaviors from Studies 1 and 2 
 
Character Attribute/ 
Identity 
Name (female/male 
version) Behaviors 
nice Nellie/Neil shares crayons 
    helps fix a classmate's broken toy 
    holds the door open for others 
mean Mia/Max never shares crayons 
    laughed when a classmate's toy breaks 
    pushes a classmate at recess 
smart Samantha/Sam gets all the math problems right 
    doesn't say anything wrong when reading aloud 
    thinks complicated homework is easy 
not-smart Victoria/Victor gets a lot of math problems wrong 
    gets stuck on easy words when reading aloud 
    thinks easy homework is hard 
pig na eats a bunch of mushed-up food 
    lives outside in a pen with other pigs 
    rolls around in the mud to stay cool 
monkey na eats bananas 
    lives with other monkeys in the tall trees 
    swings from tree to tree to look for food 
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Table 2 
 
Individual Response Patterns on Test of Minimalism in Studies 1 and 2 
 
Study 1     Attribute Change Endorsed 
                           Yes          No 
       Category       Yes        6              0 
       Change 
       Endorsed                No       21             9       
 
Study 2     Attribute Change Endorsed 
                           Yes             No 
       Category       Yes        4                0 
       Change 
       Endorsed                No       21              25                 
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 Figure 1. Mean endorsement of attribute change for human donor trials in Heart and 
Money conditions, Study 1. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
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 Figure 2.  Mean endorsement of attribute change for Heart and Money/Collar conditions, 
Study 2. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
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